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Article 7

98 N.C. L. REV. 1185 (2020)

DEFENDING THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF
FEDERAL STATUTES*
F. ANDREW HESSICK**
When a federal statute faces constitutional challenges, the Department of Justice
traditionally almost always has defended the constitutionality of that statute.
Even if attorneys in the Department think the statute is unconstitutional, they
will defend the statute so long as a reasonable argument can be made supporting
the statute’s constitutionality. Although one might think that the practice derives
from ethical obligations, it does not. Instead, it rests on prudential considerations
of maintaining a smooth relationship with Congress and ensuring that Congress
and the courts each retain their respective roles of policymaker and adjudicator.
When these prudential considerations no longer apply, we should expect to see
the practice of defending statutes break down. We should expect to see the
Executive push its own views more aggressively when litigating the
constitutionality of federal statutes. This Essay discusses the possibility of the
degradation of the Department of Justice’s practice of defending the
constitutionality of statutes through the recent example of the Department’s
aggressive stance challenging the Affordable Care Act in the Fifth Circuit, and
it offers some thoughts on ways to provide for the defense of federal statutes in
the future.
INTRODUCTION
Enacting legislation is the most important function of the United States
government. Allocating the power to legislate and describing the process by
which legislation is enacted are the first orders of business in the Constitution,
and that legislation signifies the priorities and policies of the United States. To
preserve these policies, the Department of Justice (“Department”) has adopted
a practice of protecting federal legislation from constitutional attack.1 Typically,
so long as a reasonable argument can be made supporting a statute’s
constitutionality, the Department will defend the statute. This practice
* © 2020 F. Andrew Hessick.
** Judge John J. Parker Distinguished Professor of Law. Thanks to Carissa Hessick and the
participants in the North Carolina Law Review’s symposium on Legal Ethics in the Age of Trump for their
helpful comments.
1. See, e.g., Dawn E. Johnsen, Functional Departmentalism and Nonjudicial Interpretation: Who
Determines Constitutional Meaning?, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 105, 126 (2004) (“Departments of
Justice typically defend acts of Congress that in their view are unconstitutional, as long as a reasonable
argument can [be] made in support of the law.”); see also Seth P. Waxman, Defending Congress, 79 N.C.
L. REV. 1073, 1078 (2001).
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resonates with the ethical obligation of lawyers to press with diligence the
interests of clients.2 After all, the Department appears on behalf of the United
States, and federal statutes are the laws of the United States.
But the practice does not, in fact, rest on the ethical obligation to advance
the interests of the client. Instead, it is not always clear that defending the
constitutionality of a statute is in the interests of the United States. Different
branches of government, for instance, may disagree over the constitutionality
of a statute.3
Instead of deriving from ethical obligations, the practice of defending the
constitutionality of statutes rests largely on prudential considerations. Although
the Department is part of the executive branch and accordingly owes allegiance
to the President, it has defended statutes to preserve Congress’s role as
policymaker and the judiciary’s role as adjudicator of the constitutionality of
laws.4
But if prudential reasons provide the basis for the practice of defending
statutes, we should expect to see the practice break down when those prudential
considerations no longer apply. If the executive branch is no longer concerned
with maintaining a smooth relationship with Congress, or preserving
Congress’s role as policymaker, or protecting the role of the court as adjudicator
of constitutionality, it will more aggressively push its own views when litigating
the constitutionality of federal statutes.
The Department’s position in the recent challenge to the Affordable Care
Act may be an example of this phenomenon.5 In that challenge, the Department
argues not only that the individual mandate to buy insurance is unconstitutional
but also that the rest of the Act must be struck down, despite not raising
constitutional questions itself, because it is not severable from the individual
mandate.6 It is hard to find other instances of the Department making such an
aggressive attack on the constitutionality of a federal act. This aggressive stance
may be ascribed in part to the increased polarization of political parties and the
breakdown in relations between the Executive and Congress.
This Essay considers the future of defending federal statutes. Part I
describes the Department’s practice of defending the constitutionality of federal
statutes. Part II notes some exceptions to the practice, and it explains that those
exceptions highlight that the Department first and foremost represents the
2. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019) (“A lawyer shall act
with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client.”).
3. See generally Michael Herz, United States v. United States: When Can the Federal Government
Sue Itself?, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 893 (1991) (discussing the phenomenon of divergent interests
within the United States government).
4. See Johnsen, supra note 1, at 126.
5. Texas v. United States, 945 F.3d 355, 369 (5th Cir. 2019), cert. granted sub nom. California v.
Texas, 140 S. Ct. 1262 (2020).
6. See Brief for the Federal Defendants at 49, Texas, 945 F.3d 355 (No. 19-10011).
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interests of the Executive instead of the entire United States. Part III discusses
how the recent challenge to the Affordable Care Act may represent a strong
new departure from the practice of defending the constitutionality of federal
statutes. Part IV concludes by offering some thoughts on ways to handle the
defense of federal statutes in the future.
I. THE PRACTICE OF DEFENDING THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATUTES
The Department has a practice of defending federal statutes from
constitutional attack, even when the officials of the Department believe that the
law is unconstitutional.7 We often see this practice with the Solicitor General’s
office, which decides whether to appeal any case that the federal government
has lost and which represents the United States before the Supreme Court.8
Traditionally, the Solicitor General’s office defends a federal statute from
constitutional attack so long as a reasonable argument can be made to defend
the constitutionality of the statute.9
One might think that the tradition is rooted in the ethical obligation for
attorneys to exercise diligence in representing their clients.10 After all, the
United States is the client of the Department, and defending the
constitutionality of a federal statute, one might think, is in the interest of the
United States.
But one rarely hears ethical considerations as the basis for the practice of
defending statutes. One reason is that it is not always clear that defending the
constitutionality of a statute is in the interests of the United States. To be sure,
the Constitution is the highest law in the United States, and the United States
therefore has an interest in preventing the enforcement of laws that conflict
with the Constitution. Thus, for easy cases where a statute plainly violates the
Constitution, the Department’s obligation would be to argue against the federal
statute, since the interest of all branches of the United States government is to
uphold the Constitution. Similarly, when a statute is obviously constitutional,
the obligation is to defend the statute, since the statute embodies the policies of
the United States. But it is not always clear whether a statute is constitutional.
When there is room for reasonable disagreement over the meaning of the
Constitution, it is unclear whether the ethical obligation points towards
attacking or defending the statute.
Confounding the problem is that the United States is not a single entity
with well-defined interests. The United States is more a “they” than an “it.” It
consists of three different branches of government—the Executive, legislature,
7. See, e.g., Johnsen, supra note 1, at 126.
8. See Waxman, supra note 1, at 1076.
9. Id. at 1083 (describing the “practice of defending any Act for which reasonable arguments can
be made”).
10. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019).
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and judiciary—which are then subdivided into further parts. Each of those
different components may have different interests and objectives as well as
different views about the meaning of the Constitution.11 The “People” also
arguably form a fourth group making up the United States, and they likewise
may have interests that differ from those of some or all of the branches.12
In the face of divergent interests, the Department cannot represent all the
interests of everyone who makes up the United States. Instead, the Department
must choose which set of interests to press. And because it is part of the
executive branch, the Department inevitably ends up representing the interests
of the executive branch.13
Nevertheless, even when the Department thinks a statute is
unconstitutional, it will ordinarily defend that statute. If the practice of
supporting the constitutionality of statutes that may not be constitutional does
not rest on ethical obligations, then why does the Department have the practice
of defending those statutes? The usual justification for the practice rests on
prudential considerations.14 These considerations focus on the respective roles
of each branch of government and the relationship between the Department
and those branches.15
Defending statutes helps to preserve a good relationship between the
Executive and Congress. This practice avoids the accusation that the
Department is substituting its own policy choices through constitutional
arguments for policy choices that Congress implemented through statutes. It also
avoids unnecessarily accusing Congress of violating the Constitution. Congress
has an obligation to enact only laws that it perceives are consistent with the
Constitution.16 Defending the constitutionality of a statue conveys respect for

11. See supra text accompanying note 3.
12. Nor is defending the constitutionality of a statute always obviously in the interests of any one
of these components of the United States. Although each branch has an interest in the enforcement of
federal statutes, each also has an interest in the enforcement of the Constitution. That is so even for
Congress. Congress changes with each election. Today’s Congress may view laws enacted by
yesterday’s Congress as unconstitutional.
13. See LINCOLN CAPLAN, THE TENTH JUSTICE: THE SOLICITOR GENERAL AND THE RULE
OF LAW 18 (1987). Even so, the Department often must handle competing interests because different
agencies in the executive branch may have divergent interests. See Waxman, supra note 1, at 1076
(describing how “every decision [the Solicitor General] makes comes in the context of a specific
request” from a member of the executive branch).
14. See Waxman, supra note 1, at 1078 (highlighting pragmatic reasons for the practice in that it
serves all three branches of government).
15. Id.
16. See U.S. CONST. art. VI (“The Senators and Representatives before mentioned, and the
Members of the several State Legislatures, and all executive and judicial Officers, both of the United
States and of the several States, shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support this Constitution
. . . .”).
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Congress’s constitutional conclusions.17 Further, arguing in support of a statute
may be particularly important to preserving smooth relations with Congress
when the statute was supported by individuals who are still members of
Congress.
Vigorously defending the constitutionality of statutes also maintains the
Executive’s relationship with the judiciary. The longstanding view is that the
Constitution assigns to the judiciary the task of adjudicating whether a statute
is constitutional.18 The practice of defending the constitutionality of statutes
ensures that the Executive does not usurp that function but instead leaves
determinations of constitutionality to the judiciary.19
The Department’s practice of advocating in support of federal statutes also
potentially protects the legitimacy of the federal government. It does so in at
least two ways. First, it supports the Department’s legitimacy because it
constitutes a public signal that the Department is protecting the division of
power in the Constitution by leaving policymaking to Congress and
adjudication to the judiciary. Second, it potentially bolsters Congress’s
legitimacy. Refusing to defend a statute sends a signal that the Department,
which is supposed to be acting as the advocate for the United States, has
concluded that the United States has acted unlawfully. This message may lead
to greater social disapproval and distrust of Congress.
To be sure, one might argue that the Department’s unwillingness to
defend a statute may increase the legitimacy of the executive branch. After all,
those who agree with the Executive’s position will think that the Executive is
acting as a defender of constitutionalism. But that is likely to be so only among
individuals who agree with the Executive’s position. Moreover, the increased
support for the Executive comes at the cost of less support for Congress, which
may result in a loss of legitimacy for the United States government as a whole.
By contrast, a practice of defending statutes whenever a reasonable argument
can be made may be less likely to harm the legitimacy of the executive branch
17. F. Andrew Hessick, Rethinking the Presumption of Constitutionality, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1447, 1462–63 (2010). Of course, Congress does not always evaluate the constitutionality of an act. See,
e.g., Paul A. Diller, When Congress Passes an Intentionally Unconstitutional Law: The Military Commissions
Act of 2006, 61 SMU L. REV. 281, 324 (2008) (describing the “intentional unconstitutionality” of the
Military Commissions Act of 2006).
18. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (“It is emphatically the province and
duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”).
19. Of course, the Department can always choose not to enforce a law that it considers to be
unconstitutional. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Presidential Review, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 905, 913
(1990); Jacob E. Gersen & Eric A. Posner, Soft Law: Lessons from Congressional Practice, 61 STAN. L.
REV. 573, 587 (2008) (“[T]he President and executive agencies will refuse to follow or enforce a statute
if they believe that it violates the Constitution.”). When the Department does so, it operates only in
the executive sphere by choosing how and when to enforce the law. But when a case has been brought,
the Department assumes the role of an advocate before the courts to assist the court in exercising its
judicial power.

98 N.C. L. REV. 1185 (2020)

1190

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 98

because the Department is not pressing its views but is merely acting in the role
of advocate.
II. REFUSALS TO DEFEND FEDERAL STATUTES
Because it is based on prudential instead of ethical considerations, the
practice of defending the constitutionality of federal statutes is not absolute.
The Department has declined to defend statutes—and has even attacked
statutes—when other considerations outweigh the prudential reasons for
defending them. In those situations, even when there are reasonable arguments
to support the constitutionality of the statute, the Department has refused to
argue that a challenged statute is constitutional.
One circumstance in which other considerations outweigh those
prudential reasons for defending a statute occurs when the President makes
clear his view that the statute is unconstitutional.20 For example, in United States
v. Windsor,21 the Department declined to defend the constitutionality of the
Defense of Marriage Act, which defined marriage as between a man and a
woman,22 because the President determined the law to be unconstitutional.23
Sometimes, the Department may even file a brief against a statute based on the
President’s conclusion that the statute is unconstitutional. For example, in
Metro Broadcasting v. FCC,24 presidential opposition led the Department to file
a brief against the constitutionality of a federal law prohibiting the FCC from
discarding regulatory preferences for minority-owned stations.25
There is nothing legally objectionable about this practice. The President
has an obligation to uphold the Constitution, and nothing in the Constitution
suggests that Congress’s interpretation of the Constitution trumps the
President’s. Throughout history, presidents have regularly and independently
assessed the constitutionality of statutes.26 A President who believes a statute is
unconstitutional accordingly may argue against its constitutionality. Of course,
20. See Waxman, supra note 1, at 1083 (noting that the Department may not defend a statute when
“it is manifest that the President has concluded that the statute is unconstitutional”).
21. 570 U.S. 744 (2013).
22. Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, § 3, 110 Stat. 2419, 2419 (1996) (codified at 1
U.S.C. § 7 (2018)), invalidated by Windsor, 570 U.S. at 756; see also Windsor, 570 U.S. at 752–53.
23. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of Pub. Affairs, Statement of Attorney General
on
Litigation
Involving
the
Defense
of
Marriage
Act
(Feb.
23,
2011),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/statement-attorney-general-litigation-involving-defense-marriage-act
[https://perma.cc/B3ME-6ATX] (declining to defend the Act because the “President has . . .
concluded that [the Act] . . . is . . . unconstitutional”).
24. 497 U.S. 547 (1990), overruled by Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
25. Waxman, supra note 1, at 1083.
26. Easterbrook, supra note 19, at 906–11 (documenting instances of presidential interpretation of
the Constitution); see, e.g., Michael J. Gerhardt, Presidential Defiance and the Courts, 12 HARV. L. &
POL’Y REV. 67 (2018) (recounting instances of presidential disagreement with judicial determinations
of constitutionality).
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prudential considerations similar to those underlying the Department’s practice
of defending the constitutionality of statutes may support a practice of the
President presuming a statute to be constitutional unless it is clearly
unconstitutional.27 But there are reasons that support independent
constitutional evaluation by the President28—if nothing else, it provides an
additional check against the enforcement of unconstitutional statutes.
If the President determines a statute to be unconstitutional, it makes sense
for Department attorneys to obey the President’s wishes in these circumstances.
The Department is part of the executive branch, and the President is the head
of that branch. But, at the same time, these decisions not to defend the
constitutionality of statutes despite the availability of reasonable arguments
show that the Department represents the interests of the Executive instead of
the interests of Congress or some other part of the United States.
Another circumstance in which the Department has declined to defend a
statute is when the statute bears on the distribution of power between the
Executive and other branches of government.29 In those situations, the
Department ordinarily represents the President’s interests, pressing arguments
against statutes that cabin his power.30 Consider the recent brief filed by the
United States challenging the constitutionality of 12 U.S.C. § 5491(c)(3), which
prohibits the President from removing the Director of the Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau except for “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in
office.”31 Certainly, Humphrey’s Executor v. United States,32 which upheld the
constitutionality of statutes placing conditions on the removal of heads of
independent agencies,33 provides a reasonable basis for defending the
constitutionality of the statute because the Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau is an independent agency. Nevertheless, the brief filed by the
Department argues that the statute is unconstitutional because it unduly
constrains the President’s removal power.34 This practice of the Department—
pressing arguments that favor the President instead of the other branches—
reflects the conclusion that it is more important for the Department to protect
the presidency than to defend the other branches of the United States.
27. See Presidential Authority To Decline To Execute Unconstitutional Statutes, 18 Op. O.L.C.
199, 200 (1994) (“The President should presume that enactments are constitutional. There will be some
occasions, however, when a statute appears to conflict with the Constitution. In such cases, the
President can and should exercise his independent judgment to determine whether the statute is
constitutional.”).
28. Easterbrook, supra note 19, at 927–29 (listing benefits of presidential review).
29. See Waxman, supra note 1, at 1084.
30. Id.
31. Brief for the Respondent at 3, 7, Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, No. 19-7
(U.S. Sept. 17, 2019) (quoting 12 U.S.C. § 5491(c)(3) (2018)).
32. 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
33. Id. at 629–30.
34. Brief for the Respondent, supra note 31, at 7.
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Even when the Department declines to defend a statute on the ground
that there is no reasonable argument to support the act, the decision reflects the
preferences of the Executive. For almost any statute, there is a reasonable
argument to support its constitutionality. For example, in Dickerson v. United
States,35 the Solicitor General refused to defend a federal statute that did not
require federal officers to provide Miranda warnings before interrogating
individuals in custody.36 The reason, according to then–Solicitor General
Waxman, was that no reasonable argument could be made that was consistent
with Miranda.37 But the office could have launched reasonable arguments
against the constitutionality of Miranda itself.38 After all, neither the Fifth
Amendment, which is the basis for Miranda, nor any other part of the
Constitution prescribes the warnings that officers must give under Miranda.
The office opted not to do so based on stare decisis.39 This decision reflected
the preferences of the administration. Stare decisis is not absolute, and the
Department has on many occasions argued for the overruling of constitutional
decisions.40 If President Trump instead of President Clinton held office when
Dickerson was litigated, the Department might have argued that Miranda should
be overturned.
III. THE POSSIBILITY OF INCREASINGLY AGGRESSIVE CHALLENGES TO
FEDERAL STATUTES
Typically, when the Department has declined to defend the
constitutionality of a statute, there have been powerful reasons to doubt the
statute’s constitutionality.41 In such a situation, the Department opts not to
make merely plausible arguments in favor of the statute in the face of those
other reasons.
The recent challenge to the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act42
is a departure from that typical practice. The Act has several different parts.
35. 530 U.S. 428 (2000).
36. Id. at 432; see also Waxman, supra note 1, at 1087.
37. Waxman, supra note 1, at 1087–88.
38. See, e.g., Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 445–46 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing against the
constitutionality of Miranda). Seth Waxman acknowledged that arguments could have been made
against Miranda. Waxman, supra note 1, at 1088 (stating that a balance of considerations led him to
decide not to challenge Miranda).
39. Waxman, supra note 1, at 1087–88.
40. See, e.g., Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 208–09 (1997) (recounting an argument of the
Department to overturn Establishment Clause decisions).
41. Waxman, supra note 1, at 1077–78, 1083–85 (providing examples of when the Department
refuses to defend a statute, due to either the President’s determination that the statute is
unconstitutional or because defending the statute would mean asking the Supreme Court to overrule
its own precedent).
42. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2018)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of USC titles 21, 25, 26, 29, and 42).
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One part, called the individual mandate, requires individuals to purchase
insurance.43 Other portions dictate how insurance operates. These include
provisions requiring insurers to cover preexisting conditions, placing various
caps on coverage limits, and imposing insurance obligations on employers.44
Another portion relates to the expansion of Medicaid.45
Many conservatives opposed the Affordable Care Act from the outset.46
The chief complaint was that the individual mandate unconstitutionally
required individuals to buy health insurance.47 In National Federation of
Independent Business v. Sebelius,48 the Court upheld the individual mandate based
on the taxing power.49 Individuals who did not purchase insurance would face a
tax fine.50 The Court said this was functionally a tax: buy insurance and get
lower taxes; don’t buy insurance and pay higher taxes.51
After the GOP secured both houses of Congress and the presidency in the
2016 election, Congress enacted legislation reducing the tax penalty for failing
to comply with the individual mandate to zero dollars.52 That led to the next
lawsuit challenging the Affordable Care Act.53 That suit argues that, because
failing to buy insurance has no tax consequence, the individual mandate is no
longer an exercise of the tax power and, accordingly, is unconstitutional.54 From
here, the plaintiffs make a much bigger claim. They argue that, if the mandate
is unconstitutional, the entire Act must fall. According to the plaintiffs, the
individual mandate is not severable from the rest of the Act.55
The district court agreed with the plaintiffs and struck down the entire
Affordable Care Act.56 Although it defended the Act in the district court, the
Department under the Trump administration switched sides in the Fifth
Circuit, arguing that the entire Act must be struck down.57 The administration’s
43. 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(a) (2018).
44. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-3(a) (2018) (preexisting conditions); id. § 300gg (coverage rate
limitations); 26 U.S.C. § 4980H (2018) (employer shared responsibility).
45. 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (2018).
46. See Gregory M. Lipper, The Contraceptive-Coverage Cases and Politicized Free-Exercise Lawsuits,
2016 U. ILL. L. REV. 1331, 1333–34 (“Well before Congress enacted [the Affordable Care Act] in 2010,
conservatives opposed it—quite viscerally.”).
47. Randy E. Barnett, Commandeering the People: Why the Individual Health Insurance Mandate Is
Unconstitutional, 5 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 581, 582 (2010).
48. 567 U.S. 519 (2012).
49. Id. at 570.
50. Id. at 562–63.
51. Id.
52. Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-97, § 11081, 131 Stat. 2054, 2092 (codified as
amended at 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(c) (2018)).
53. Texas v. United States, 340 F. Supp. 3d 579, 585 (N.D. Tex. 2018).
54. See id. at 591.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 619.
57. See Brief for the Federal Defendants, supra note 6, at 36–49.
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position was remarkable: it did not simply opt against making a reasonable
argument supporting the Affordable Care Act, which would have been
consistent with the typical practice when the Department declines to defend a
statute. Instead, the Department made an argument at the other end of the
spectrum, pressing a position that is itself verging on unreasonable. In other
words, instead of reaching out to defend the constitutionality of a statute, the
Department opted to reach out to attack the constitutionality of a statute.
The Department’s position was dubious for two reasons. First, whether a
provision is severable depends on the intent of Congress.58 A provision is
severable if Congress meant for the rest of the law to stand if that provision
were to be struck down.59 Thus, the Department’s argument that the mandate
is not severable means that Congress intended the rest of the Act to fall if the
mandate were struck down. That is highly unlikely. By reducing the penalty to
zero dollars, Congress made the mandate an empty requirement. There is no
consequence for disregarding it, so whether it is constitutional is an academic
question. Striking it down would not absolve anyone of a penalty that they
would otherwise have to pay. At the same time, when Congress reduced the
mandate penalty to zero, it did not address the other provisions of the Act. It
left them untouched. Congress therefore abolished the mandate while not
overturning the other portions of the Act.
There are two likely explanations for this decision. First, either Congress
deliberately preserved the other provisions of the Act, or second, it did not have
the votes to remove those provisions. In either case, it is hard to say that
Congress intended the whole law to fall by reducing the mandate to zero dollars.
It would mean that, instead of overturning the Affordable Care Act by enacting
legislation striking the Act from the books, Congress sought to overturn the Act
by leaving it in place and tinkering with a single provision.
Second, and even more remarkable, the Department did not limit its
argument to the provision that raises the constitutional problem: the individual
mandate. Instead, by claiming the provisions are inseverable, the Department
argued that all the provisions—including provisions that do not raise
constitutional problems—should be struck down. It is hard to think of another
time the Department made such a concerted effort to knock down a statutory
scheme that did not raise constitutional problems.
The Fifth Circuit ultimately agreed with the plaintiffs and the
Department that, after the reduction of the tax penalty, the individual mandate
was no longer a valid exercise of the taxing power.60 But the court punted on
58. Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New England, 546 U.S. 320, 330 (2006).
59. Id. (stating that the inquiry is whether Congress would “have preferred what is left of its
statute to no statute at all”).
60. Texas v. United States, 945 F.3d 355, 390 (5th Cir. 2019)), cert. granted sub nom. California v.
Texas, 140 S. Ct. 1262 (2020).
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the severability question. It vacated the district court’s order on the ground that
the district court was not sufficiently careful in assessing severability, and it
remanded with orders that the district court reassess severability “employ[ing]
a finer-toothed comb.”61 This determination leaves the Department with the
opportunity to continue to pursue its severability claim in the district court.
How to explain the intensity and scope of the Department’s attack on the
Affordable Care Act? One possible explanation is that the usual reasons for
defending a statute no longer apply. Just as we should expect the Department
to decline to defend a statute when other countervailing considerations
outweigh the prudential reasons for defending a statute, we should also expect
the Department to refuse to defend a statute when the prudential reasons
simply no longer apply. For example, if one of the major reasons for defending
a statute with which the Executive disagrees is to preserve a smooth relationship
with Congress, we should expect to see less willingness to defend a statute when
there is no need to protect that relationship—if, for example, Congress and the
Executive already have a dysfunctional relationship, and the President is not
particularly interested in mending that relationship.
In addition, if the Executive is not interested in preserving a relationship
with Congress, we should expect to see the Department increase its willingness
to attack federal statutes. It may no longer choose to do so when there are
reasonable arguments, instead pressing views that more generally align with the
philosophy of the President. The Department’s attack on the Affordable Care
Act may be a product of these changing dynamics. It is hardly a secret that
President Trump does not aspire to placate those in Congress who have views
that differ from his.62
Although the Department’s attack on the Affordable Care Act stands out
because it is so aggressive, it may become the norm. Increasingly polarized
politics suggests that the Executive and Congress often will not share the same
interests, and the increased acrimony between the Executive and Congress
decreases the likelihood that the Department will take pains to represent the
interests of Congress.
At the same time, courts have become the forum for resolving policy
disagreements.63 People now routinely turn to the courts to fight vanguard
61. Id. at 402.
62. See, e.g., John Haltiwanger, Trump Says He Won’t Work with Democrats Until They Drop Their
‘Phony Investigations’ into Him, BUS. INSIDER (May 22, 2019), https://www.businessinsider.com/trumpsays-he-wont-work-with-democrats-until-they-drop-investigations-2019-5 [https://perma.cc/T8GTJEGQ]; see also Peter Baker, Trump Wants To Neutralize Democrats on Health Care. Republicans Say Let
It Go., N.Y. TIMES (June 16, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/16/us/politics/trump-healthcare-democrats-2020.html [https://perma.cc/JY3K-ARUK (dark archive)].
63. Courts now hear quintessentially political determinations, such as who won an election, see
Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 111 (2000); see also Rachel E. Barkow, More Supreme Than Court? The Fall
of the Political Question Doctrine and the Rise of Judicial Supremacy, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 237, 336 (2002),
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actions on legislation that they cannot get overturned in Congress. The
Executive itself may not be in the practice of filing lawsuits directly challenging
federal statutes, but it has supported those who have challenged federal
legislation, as in the challenge to the Affordable Care Act. And it may be only
a matter of time before the Executive regularly launches court actions against
federal statutes.64
IV. DEFENDING STATUTES IN THE FUTURE
What to do about this situation? One possibility is simply to stay this new
course. The Department will continue to defend the constitutionality of most
statutes, but it will aggressively attack those statutes with which it disagrees.
Among the various downsides of this approach is that it could exacerbate
political divides and escalate tensions with Congress. It also tends to politicize
the courts to the extent that it seems the Executive is employing the courts to
do its bidding against Congress.
Of course, there are reasons to support stronger executive attacks on
statutes. For example, one of the themes of the Constitution is to limit federal
law. To that end, the Constitution establishes various structural obstacles to
legislation, such as bicameralism and presentment.65 Refusing to defend
legislation pushes in that direction. But those advantages come at a heavy cost.
To be sure, matters may reverse course. Over time, political tensions may
abate, and the Department may take less aggressive stances against federal
statutes. But that is hardly guaranteed. No doubt, the level of political tension
may be higher today than many people in the past would have predicted. In the
future, it is entirely possible that the Department will be less defensive of, and
more aggressive toward, statutes that do not align with the views of the
President.
A second option is to prohibit the Department from arguing against the
constitutionality of a federal statute at all. If a suit challenges the
constitutionality of a federal law, the Department can defend the statute and
otherwise participate in the suit. But it cannot make any arguments against the
constitutionality of the law.

and President Trump has indicated that he will appeal any impeachment proceeding to the Supreme
Court, Adam Liptak, Can Trump Challenge His Impeachment in the Supreme Court?, N.Y. TIMES (Nov.
25,
2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/25/us/trump-impeachment-supreme-court.html
[https://perma.cc/29Q6-VYFP (dark archive)].
64. In the same vein, the increasing prevalence of nationwide injunctions has increased the role
of the courts in resolving disputes. See, e.g., Howard M. Wasserman, “Nationwide” Injunctions Are Really
“Universal” Injunctions and They Are Never Appropriate, 22 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 335, 350, 353 (2018)
(discussing how nationwide injunctions increase the role of lower courts in policymaking).
65. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7.
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This situation is not ideal because the function of the Department is to
enforce the law of the land, and the Constitution is the highest law of the land.
One would therefore think that the Department has some obligation to argue
against statutes that conflict with the Constitution. It would also likely result
in congressional encroachments on executive power. The President will be
unable to protect his domain by challenging statutes that encroach on the
executive power—statutes such as those limiting his pardoning power or
constraining his power to remove high-level executive officials. Indeed,
Congress may even feel emboldened to enact legislation in deliberate efforts to
curtail executive power. To be sure, private litigants who are harmed through
statutory schemes that limit presidential powers may challenge those statutes.
But they may not be in the best position to offer the strongest arguments against
those statutes because their interest may not necessarily align precisely with
those of the President.
A third possibility is to establish an office whose job is to defend the
constitutionality of statutes. Whenever a case raises a constitutional challenge
to a federal statute, this office would have the opportunity to defend the statute.
One might argue that creating an office is unnecessary when the Department
defends a statute and that the attorney should participate only when the
Department opts not to defend a statute. In some sense, we already have this
system. Although the Department has the primary role of defending statutes, it
has refused to defend some statutes. In those cases, the Supreme Court has
appointed counsel to represent Congress to defend the constitutionality of the
statute.66 Moreover, on at least one occasion, such as in the case Buckley v.
Valeo,67 the Department itself took the position of defending a statute even
while attacking it by filing two separate briefs regarding the constitutionality of
the statute.68 At issue in that case was whether statutory limits on campaign
contributions and expenditures violated the First Amendment.69 The Attorney
General and Federal Election Commission filed a brief defending the
constitutionality of the statute.70 The Solicitor General filed another brief on
66. See, e.g., Waxman, supra note 1, at 1084–85.
67. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
68. Brief for Attorney General as Appellee and for the United Sates as Amicus Curiae at 2,
Buckley, 424 U.S. 1 (No. 75-436) (“The Attorney General . . . joins only the separate portion of this
brief that addresses . . . the Federal Election Commission’s powers, which apparently trench on
authority reserved to the Executive by Article II of the Constitution.”); Brief for the Attorney General
and Federal Election Commission at front cover n.1, Buckley, 424 U.S. 1 (No. 75-436) (“The Attorney
General is participating as counsel on both this brief and the separate brief for the United States.”).
69. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 14.
70. Charles N. Steele & Jeffrey H. Bowman, The Constitutionality of Independent Regulatory Agencies
Under the Necessary and Proper Clause: The Case of the Federal Election Commission, 4 YALE J. ON REG.
363, 379 nn.92–93 (1987); see also Marty Lederman, Commentary: The Return of the Robert Bork “Dueling
Briefs” Strategy: Buckley v. Valeo, Susan B. Anthony List, and Ohio Attorney General DeWine,
SCOTUSBLOG (Mar. 17, 2014), https://www.scotusblog.com/2014/03/commentary-the-return-of-
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behalf of the United States taking a much more aggressive stance on the
constitutionality of the statute.71
This approach, using the already-established Department to sometimes
defend and sometimes challenge statutes, is satisfactory for many cases, but not
all. It is possible that, because of political pressures, the Department may defend
a statute but not raise the best arguments to do so. That risk goes up if a separate
congressional attorney is not permitted when the Department defends a federal
statute. As a result, the Department may half-heartedly defend a statute
precisely to prevent the separate attorney from appearing to present a stronger
argument.
Moreover, both of these approaches—appointing an amicus to defend a
statute and dividing the Department to defend and attack a statute—are ad hoc
solutions. They might not be observed in the future. When the Department
opts not to defend a law, the court might not appoint an amicus, and the
Department might opt not to file separate briefs. An office committed to
defending statutes avoids this problem.
It would also result in an institution that has more expertise relating to
and strategic vision for defending statutes that the Department does not
defend—such as statutes limiting presidential power. Right now, the
Department regularly defends statutes that arguably infringe on the Fourth
Amendment rights of individuals.72 Moreover, the Department has often
defended statutes by picking cases carefully over time, choosing the order in
which to make arguments to the courts so that it can eventually establish
precedent that supports a particular position. But the Department does not play
a similar role in defending the constitutionality of statutes limiting the power
of the President. Nor does any other office. Because of the ad hoc way in which
those statutes are defended, there is no institutional role of defending statutes
limiting presidential power.
CONCLUSION
The Department of Justice theoretically represents the entire United
States, but in practice, it represents the interests of the Executive. That reality
is unproblematic when the interests of the Executive align with the interests of
the other branches. But when interests diverge, there is the possibility for
conflict. Through the years, prudential considerations have muted the potential

the-robert-bork-dueling-briefs-strategy-buckley-v-valeo-susan-b-anthony-list-and-ohio-attorneygeneral-dewine/ [https://perma.cc/4D4U-LN8V].
71. Steele & Bowman, supra note 70, at 379 nn.92–93.
72. For an example from just last term, see Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018), in
which the United States argued that the Fourth Amendment did not require the government to obtain
warrants in order to acquire information from wireless providers.
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conflict, leading the Department to adopt practices such as the tradition of
defending federal statutes from constitutional attack.
But those practices may be at risk with increased political polarization and
antagonism between branches. The Department may have greater incentives to
push the Executive’s agenda over Congress’s agenda. It may be high time to
reconsider how the interests of the United States are represented in the courts.
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